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_________________ 
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
_________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
This appeal raises a question of first impression involving 
the interpretation of Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., in the common circumstance of a debtor 
converting his or her case from a Chapter 13 adjustment of debts 
under a reorganization plan to a Chapter 7 liquidation of assets 
and distribution to creditors.
1
  If at the time of conversion the 
Chapter 13 trustee is holding funds acquired post-petition by the 
                                                 
1
 The primary goal of a Chapter 13 case is the confirmation and 
completion of a reorganization plan, which results in the 
discharge of the Chapter 13 debtor‘s debts.  See 11 U.S.C. § 
1328(a) (providing for discharge ―as soon as practicable after 
completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan‖).  If a 
debtor cannot confirm or complete a plan, his case most likely 
either will be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation or dismissed.  
But see id. § 1328(b) (detailing the circumstances in which a 
debtor may receive a discharge despite not completing a plan).  
Empirical studies show that about a third of Chapter 13 debtors 
successfully confirm and complete a plan.  See, e.g., Katherine 
Porter, ―The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of 
Bankruptcy Outcomes,‖ 90 Tex. L. Rev. 103, 107–11 (2011) 
(summarizing studies published from 1989 through 2006, all of 
which concluded that only one in three cases filed under Chapter 
13 ended in a completed reorganization plan, and noting that the 
ratio of discharge to conversion or dismissal has ―persisted for 
more than thirty years‖).  
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debtor for eventual distribution to creditors under a confirmed 
Chapter 13 reorganization plan, must the trustee return the funds 
to the debtor or distribute them to creditors under the provisions 
of the plan?  The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court‘s 
holding that those funds are to be returned to the debtor at the 
time of conversion.  We agree and thus affirm the District 
Court‘s decision. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History   
Appellee Barry Michael filed a voluntary petition under 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in September 2005.  In June 
2006, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed his Chapter 13 
reorganization plan (the ―Plan‖).  The Plan provided that 
Michael would pay approximately $277 per month to the 
Chapter 13 trustee, Appellant Charles J. DeHart, III (the 
―Trustee‖), for 53 months, and the Trustee would direct the 
monies received to creditors holding secured and priority claims. 
Among these creditors was GMAC Mortgage, which held a 
mortgage on Michael‘s residence.  Michael agreed also to make 
regular mortgage payments to GMAC outside of the Plan.  The 
Plan further provided that, to the extent funds were available, 
creditors holding unsecured claims would be paid pro rata.  To 
complete his bargain and fund the Plan, Michael allowed his 
wages to be attached and paid directly to the Trustee.   
Michael, however, was unable to make mortgage 
payments to GMAC outside of the Plan, and in August 2006 the 
Bankruptcy Court granted GMAC relief from the automatic stay 
to allow it to foreclose on Michael‘s residence.  Because 
Michael did not move to amend the Plan or modify the wage 
attachment order, the Trustee continued to receive automatic 
payments from Michael‘s employer.  When the Trustee 
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attempted to forward the funds to GMAC as provided by the 
Plan, GMAC refused to accept the payments (ostensibly because 
it wanted to foreclose—pun intended—an estoppel and/or 
waiver defense to its mortgage foreclosure).  The funds 
continued to accumulate in the Trustee‘s account until Michael 
moved to convert his case to Chapter 7 in October 2009.   
Several days after the conversion, Michael filed a motion 
seeking an order compelling the return to him by the Trustee of 
the accumulated funds, which amounted to $9,181.62.  The 
Trustee objected, arguing that the funds should be distributed 
pro rata to unsecured creditors as provided by the Plan.   
Both the Bankruptcy and District Courts noted that the 
Bankruptcy Code does not provide a clear answer on whether 
undistributed plan payments held by a Chapter 13 trustee should 
be returned to the debtor or distributed to creditors under a plan 
when a Chapter 13 case is converted to Chapter 7.  Each court 
assessed the main arguments advanced by the parties and 
discussed by other (mainly bankruptcy) courts regarding 
statutory language, legislative intent, and the goals of the Code.  
They both concluded that the funds must be returned to Michael. 
The Trustee filed a timely notice of appeal.
2
   
                                                 
2
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 
and 1334.  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 158(a) and 1334.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 158(d) and 1291.  Because a district court sits as an appellate 
court to review a bankruptcy court, we review a bankruptcy 
court‘s ―legal determinations de novo, its factual findings for 
clear error, and its exercises of discretion for abuse thereof.‖  In 
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II.  Discussion     
 We have a pure question of law—what does the 
Bankruptcy Code require a Chapter 13 trustee to do with 
undistributed funds received pursuant to a confirmed Chapter 13 
plan when that Chapter 13 case is converted to Chapter 7?  Not 
only does the Code provide no clear answer to this question, in 
reading it one finds an internal tension, as separate provisions 
seemingly lead to divergent results.     
Both the Bankruptcy and District Courts began their 
analyses, as do we, with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994‘s 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.  Included in those 
amendments was § 348(f), on which this appeal ultimately turns. 
 That section provides that on conversion of a case from Chapter 
13 to another Chapter, ―property of the estate in the converted 
case shall consist of property of the estate, as of the date of filing 
of the petition, that remains in the possession of or is under the 
control of the debtor on the date of conversion.‖  11 U.S.C. 
§ 348(f)(1)(A) (emphasis added).  In the case of a bad faith 
conversion, ―the property of the estate in the converted case 
shall consist of the property of the estate as of the date of 
conversion.‖  Id. § 348(f)(2) (emphasis added).  
                                                                                                             
re Goody’s Family Clothing Inc., 610 F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 
2010).   
The Chapter 13 Standing Trustees in our Circuit filed an amicus 
brief in support of the Trustee.  The National Association of 
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys submitted an amicus brief in 
support of Michael. 
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 Prior to the addition of § 348(f), courts considering the 
disposition of funds held by a Chapter 13 trustee at the time of 
conversion reached three different results: the funds were 
(i) property of the new Chapter 7 estate, (ii) property of the 
debtor, or (iii) property of creditors under a confirmed Chapter 
13 plan.  See, e.g., In re Boggs, 137 B.R. 408, 411 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wash. 1992) (concluding that the debtor is entitled to 
undistributed funds held by the Chapter 13 trustee on conversion 
to Chapter 7); Waugh v. Saldamarco (In re Waugh), 82 B.R. 
394, 400 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that the Chapter 13 
trustee must pay out undistributed funds to the creditors as 
provided by the Chapter 13 plan on conversion); In re Tracy, 28 
B.R. 189, 190 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983) (holding that the Chapter 
13 trustee must turn over undistributed funds to the Chapter 7 
trustee on conversion).  Courts of Appeals primarily debated 
whether the funds became property of the Chapter 7 estate.  
Compare Calder v. Job (In re Calder), 973 F.2d 862, 865–66 
(10th Cir. 1992) (holding that post-petition funds that were part 
of the Chapter 13 estate became property of the Chapter 7 estate 
on conversion to Chapter 7), Matter of Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 
138 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); and Armstrong v. Lindberg (In re 
Lindberg), 735 F.2d 1087, 1089–90 (8th Cir. 1984) (same), with 
Bobroff v. Cont’l Bank (In re Bobroff), 766 F.2d 797, 803–04 
(3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a post-petition tort claim did not 
become property of the Chapter 7 estate on conversion).   
Section 348(f) removed the first result, but did not 
resolve explicitly whether the Chapter 13 trustee should give the 
funds to the debtor or distribute them to creditors under the 
confirmed Chapter 13 plan.  As developed below, § 348(f)‘s 
language and legislative history express Congress‘s preference 
as to what property belongs to a debtor after conversion, and 
ultimately direct our decision. 
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 To understand the full import of § 348(f), we provide a 
brief overview of a Chapter 13 case.  The filing of a Chapter 13 
petition creates an estate consisting of all of the debtor‘s legal 
and equitable interests in property.  11 U.S.C. §§ 301(a), 
541(a).
3
  ―[I]n addition to the property specified in section 541‖ 
that exists at the filing of the Chapter 13 petition, the estate 
includes ―all property of the kind specified in [section 541] that 
the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but 
before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under 
chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs first . . . .‖ Id. 
§ 1306(a).  This includes ―earnings from services performed by 
the debtor after the commencement of the case but before the 
case is closed, dismissed, or converted . . . .‖  Id. § 1306(b).  As 
is the case here, these earnings ordinarily fund the Chapter 13 
plan.  See, e.g., 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1322.01 (Alan N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012) (―Chapter 13 
was designed to facilitate adjustments of the debts of individuals 
with regular income through flexible repayment plans funded 
primarily from future income.‖).  
A debtor must begin making payments to the Chapter 13 
trustee ―not later than 30 days after the date of the filing of the 
plan or the order for relief [defined below], whichever is 
earlier . . . .‖ 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1).  The trustee must retain 
these payments ―until confirmation or denial of confirmation [of 
                                                 
3
 In pertinent part, § 301 reads:  ―A voluntary case under a 
chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the 
bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity 
that may be a debtor under such chapter.‖  Section 541(a) 
provides that ―[t]he commencement of a case under section 301 . 
. . creates an estate.‖  
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a plan]. . . .  If a plan is not confirmed, the trustee shall return 
any such payments not previously paid . . . to the debtor, after 
deducting any unpaid claim allowed under section 503(b).‖  Id. 
§ 1326(a)(2).   
 Confirmation of a reorganization plan under Chapter 13 
affects the estate, debtor, creditors, and Chapter 13 trustee.  The 
confirmed plan vests all of the property of the estate in the 
debtor, id. § 1327(b); binds the debtor and its creditors, id. 
§ 1327(a); and obligates the trustee to distribute the debtor‘s 
payments under the plan to creditors, id. § 1326(a)(2), (c).
4
  At 
any time during the Chapter 13 proceeding, the debtor has a near 
absolute right to convert his case.  Id. § 1307(a) (―The debtor 
may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 
of this title at any time.  Any waiver of the right to convert under 
this subsection is unenforceable.‖).  Regardless when 
conversion takes place, it ―does not effect a change in the date 
of the filing of the petition.‖  Id. § 348(a).   
                                                 
4
 In pertinent part, § 1326(a)(2) reads:  ―If a plan is confirmed, 
the trustee shall distribute any such payment [made under 
§ 1326(a)(1)] in accordance with the plan as soon as is 
practicable.‖  Section 1326(c) similarly states:  ―Except as 
otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the 
plan, the trustee shall make payments to creditors under the 
plan.‖  Sections 1327(a) and (b), respectively, provide that: 
―[t]he provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each 
creditor,‖ regardless whether a creditor accepted the plan; and 
―[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or the order 
confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the 
property of the estate in the debtor.‖    
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Conversion also ―terminates the services‖ of the Chapter 
13 trustee.  Id. § 348(e).  Though his services are ended after 
conversion, the trustee is required to account for the funds that 
came into his possession by filing a final report under Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1019(5)(B)(ii).  In addition, if the 
case is converted prior to confirmation of a plan, the trustee 
must return any payments held by him to the debtor after 
deducting adequate funds for him to pay allowed administrative 
expense claims.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2). 
 Accordingly, when a debtor converts a Chapter 13 case to 
Chapter 7, the order converting the case is effectively backdated 
to the time of the order for relief under Chapter 13, which is the 
date of the filing of the Chapter 13 petition.  See id. § 301(b) 
(―The commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of this 
title constitutes an order for relief under such chapter.‖).  
Section 348(f), to repeat, states that ―property of the estate in the 
converted case shall consist of property of the estate, as of the 
date of filing of the petition, that remains in the possession of or 
is under the control of the debtor as of the date of conversion.‖  
Id. § 348(f)(1) (emphasis added).  Because under § 348(a) ―the 
date of the filing of the petition‖ is the date the debtor filed the 
Chapter 13 petition, this suggests that property of the Chapter 13 
estate acquired post-petition is excluded from the property of the 
new Chapter 7 estate.  But does that property belong to the 
debtor or to its creditors waiting for Chapter 13 plan payments? 
 It is here we turn to § 1327(b), which vests all property of 
the Chapter 13 estate in the debtor on plan confirmation.  The 
implication is that property held by the Chapter 13 trustee after 
plan confirmation is ―under the control of the debtor as of the 
date of [a later] conversion‖ for purposes of § 348(f)(1).  Even 
before the addition of § 348(f), the Ninth Circuit Court arrived 
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at this conclusion regarding the vesting of monies received by 
the Chapter 13 trustee from the debtor during the Chapter 13 
proceeding.  Arkison v. Plata (In re Plata), 958 F.2d 918 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
Confirmation . . . binds the creditors and the 
debtor to the provisions of the plan and vests all 
property of the estate in the debtor except as 
otherwise provided in the plan.  The monies 
received by the Chapter 13 trustee from the 
debtors during the Chapter 13 proceeding became 
part of the Chapter 13 estate.  The debtors‘ 
creditors acquired a nonvested interest in these 
monies by the plan and the order confirming the 
plan.  A Chapter 13 creditor‘s interests do not vest 
until the monies are distributed. . . .  The debtors‘ 
interests in the monies have not been 
extinguished. 
Id. at 922 (quoting Resendez v. Lindquist, 691 F.2d 397, 399–
400 (8th Cir. 1982) (Bright, J., dissenting)).  Moreover, under 
§ 348(e), after conversion the services of the Chapter 13 trustee 
are terminated, which seemingly renders it powerless to make 
payments to creditors under a Chapter 13 plan.      
 Nevertheless, confirmation of a plan is a significant event 
in a Chapter 13 case.  This has led several courts, in decisions 
primarily written before the addition of § 348(f), to conclude 
that undistributed plan payments held by a Chapter 13 trustee 
should be disbursed to creditors after conversion.  They reason 
that the funds should be treated as trust funds for the benefit of 
creditors, or that creditors held a vested interest in the funds at 
the time the trustee received them, because the debtor 
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voluntarily parted with the funds and §§ 1326(a)(2) and (c) state 
that the trustee ―shall‖ distribute payments as provided by the 
plan.  See, e.g., In re Galloway, 134 B.R. 602, 603 (Bankr. W.D. 
Ky. 1991) (holding that after a debtor ―voluntarily part[s] with 
wages and deliver[s] them to the custody of a trustee in 
performance of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan, the creditors have 
a vested right to receive those payments pursuant to the plan‖); 
In re Waugh, 82 B.R. at 400 (observing that the word ―shall‖ in 
§ 1326(a)(2) ―creates the condition of a trust.  Creditors have the 
right to the funds in an active confirmed chapter 13 plan on 
payment by the debtor‖); In re Rutenbeck, 78 B.R. 912, 913 
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (―[T]he undistributed funds ought to be 
treated as trust funds for the benefit of the creditors under the 
confirmed plan and distributed to those creditors in accordance 
with the terms of the plan.‖); In re Lennon, 65 B.R. 130, 137 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding that the ―mandatory provision‖ 
of § 1326(a)(2) ―has the effect of vesting an interest in creditors 
provided for by a confirmed plan in all payments pursuant to 
such plan‖).   
 These courts also emphasize that a confirmed plan binds 
creditors to a new relationship with a debtor, one that requires 
creditors to forgo certain rights in exchange for the debtor‘s 
promise to make payments under the plan.  See, e.g., Ledford v. 
Burns (In re Burns), 90 B.R. 301, 304 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) 
(―[A] Chapter 13 Plan represents a legislatively sanctioned, and 
judicially approved[,] new series of rights and responsibilities 
among the debtor and the debtor‘s creditors.‖).  Thus despite the 
termination of the Chapter 13 trustee‘s services after conversion, 
they conclude that a ―valid confirmation order of the Bankruptcy 
Court should not be made a nullity by a later failure of the 
debtor to observe a confirmed plan.‖  Spero v. Porreco (In re 
Porreco), 426 B.R. 529, 537 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting In 
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re Waugh, 82 B.R. at 400); see also In re Pegues, 266 B.R. 328, 
336–37 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001) (―Although the service of the 
chapter 13 trustee is terminated by Section 348(e), it is clear that 
Congress intended that the chapter 13 trustee shall wind up the 
affairs of the chapter 13 estate, including disbursing monies on 
hand to the appropriate recipient.‖); In re Burns, 90 B.R. at 304 
(―While it would be inappropriate to ignore other provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code, it would be equally inappropriate to fail to 
judicially implement an order that the court has previously 
entered, particularly one in which the debtors voluntarily 
proposed the provisions, advocated their adoption and requested 
the court to order as binding upon the debtors and their 
creditors.‖).   
Additionally, these courts further cite § 1326(a)(2) for its 
language requiring the Chapter 13 trustee to return any payments 
held by it to the debtor if a plan is not confirmed (after 
deducting funds for it to pay allowed administrative expense 
claims).  Read alone, this section arguably indicates that if a 
plan is not confirmed the trustee must return accumulated funds 
to the debtor, and that if a plan is confirmed the trustee, by 
implication stemming from the absence of similar language, is 
required to distribute accumulated funds to creditors as provided 
by the plan.  That is, if Congress intended for undistributed 
funds held by the trustee post-confirmation to be returned to a 
debtor, it could have included similar language regarding post-
confirmation payments in § 1326(a)(2).  See In re Burns, 90 
B.R. at 304.  Moreover, holding that the funds are to be returned 
to debtors produces the anomalous result that all or a portion of 
administrative expense claims may be paid in a Chapter 13 case 
converted pre-confirmation, but not in one converted post-
confirmation.   
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 In contrast, other courts, again in decisions written 
primarily before the addition of § 348(f), have read the same 
provisions of the Code and concluded that the debtor is entitled 
to undistributed plan payments held by the Chapter 13 trustee at 
the time of conversion.  These courts focus on § 348(a) and the 
Congressional policy of encouraging debtors to attempt Chapter 
13 without penalty if the attempt fails.  See, e.g., In re Boggs, 
137 B.R. at 411 (―[T]he Congressional policy of encouraging 
debtors to repay their creditors via Chapter 13 is furthered by 
debtors (and their counsel) knowing they will not be penalized 
for attempting Chapter 13.‖); McCullough v. Luna (In re Luna), 
73 B.R. 999, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (concluding that § 348(a), 
―which determines the operative date for the filing of [the 
debtor‘s] Chapter 7 proceeding, protects [the debtor] from being 
penalized by providing that the Chapter 7 estate is deemed to 
have been filed at the time the Chapter 13 estate was filed‖); In 
re Bullock, 41 B.R. 637, 640 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (―[T]he 
case is deemed to have been filed as a chapter 7 proceeding and 
that portion of the debtor‘s postpetition wages, which were 
deducted from his salary, were deposited in the chapter 7 estate 
although they were not properly includable therein . . . .  Since 
the deducted wages were not part of the chapter 7 estate, the 
debtor is entitled to recover such wages in full . . . .‖).  
 In response to those courts holding that undistributed 
funds should be paid out to creditors, contrary rulings have 
reasoned that conversion effectively vacates the confirmed plan. 
 ―[Section] 1307(a) gives debtors the absolute right to convert to 
Chapter 7 at any time.  Analytically, a Chapter 13 plan has no 
relevance to or import in a case under any other chapter. . . .  If a 
plan is vacated or no longer in effect, a Chapter 13 trustee has 
no authority for further disbursement to creditors.‖  In re Boggs, 
137 B.R. at 410; see also In re Doyle, 11 B.R. 110, 111 (Bank. 
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E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that, once a case is converted, the order 
confirming the plan is no longer effective).  Other decisions 
simply conclude that the termination of the trustee‘s services 
―precludes the Trustee from taking any action with respect to 
these funds after the conversion.‖  In re Luna, 73 B.R. at 1002; 
see also In re Perkins, 36 B.R. 618, 620 (Bank. M.D. Tenn. 
1983) (holding that the Chapter 13 trustee loses all authority to 
act when the conversion becomes effective).          
 These courts also find nothing ―unjust‖ in returning 
undistributed plan payments to a debtor.  Rather, they note that 
creditors ultimately will receive as much, if not more, than they 
would have received if the debtor initially had filed under 
Chapter 7.   
Since § 1325(a) requires a finding that the holder 
of each allowed unsecured claim will receive not 
less than the holder would receive under Chapter 
7 to confirm a plan, it is not self-evident that the 
dilution effect of treating pre-conversion creditors 
as pre-petition creditors in the converted Chapter 
7 necessarily inflicts a net loss on actual pre-
petition creditors. Those creditors have had the 
benefit of distribution from debtors‘ wage 
contributions, which would not have been 
available to them under Chapter 7.  In all, there 
seems no inherent inequity in refunding 
undisbursed wage contributions to debtors on 
conversion.  
In re Boggs, 137 B.R. at 410. 
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Notwithstanding strong arguments regarding the binding 
effect of plan confirmation, those courts holding that 
undistributed payments under a confirmed Chapter 13 plan 
should be disbursed to creditors after conversion overlook that 
no provision in the Bankruptcy Code classifies any property, 
including post-petition wages, as belonging to creditors.  Rather, 
property comes into and flows out of the estate.  In the context 
of a Chapter 13 case, § 1327(b) vests all property of the Chapter 
13 estate in the debtor on confirmation of the plan.  Thus when 
the debtor transfers funds to the Chapter 13 trustee to fulfill its 
obligations under a confirmed plan (or, as here, wages are 
assigned directly to the Chapter 13 trustee under a garnishment 
order), the funds become part of the estate, and the debtor 
retains a vested interest in them.  Though creditors have a right 
to those payments based on the confirmed plan, the debtor does 
not lose his vested interest until the trustee affirmatively 
transfers the funds to creditors.  Also, §§ 1326(a)(2) and (c) only 
address the obligation of the trustee to distribute payments in 
accordance with a confirmed plan; they do not vest creditors 
with any property rights.   
Conversion to a Chapter 7 case necessarily ends the 
Chapter 13 case, which also terminates that Chapter 13 estate.  
Section 348(f) clarifies what becomes of property of the now 
nonexistent Chapter 13 estate.  It provides that property of the 
Chapter 7 estate ―consist[s] of property of the estate, as of the 
date of filing of the [Chapter 7] petition, that remains in the 
possession of or is under the control of the debtor on the date of 
conversion.‖  11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1) (emphases added).  Because 
§ 1327(b) vests all property of the Chapter 13 estate in the 
debtor, including any post-petition property held by the Chapter 
13 trustee at the time of conversion (such as funds transferred to 
the estate for eventual distribution to creditors), on conversion 
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property of the Chapter 13 estate usually is ―under the control of 
the debtor.‖5  And because § 348(a) establishes that conversion 
does not change the effect of the Chapter 13 petition‘s filing, the 
Chapter 7 petition date is deemed to be the same date that the 
debtor began the Chapter 13 case.  Hence property acquired 
post-petition that is in the Chapter 13 estate at the time of 
conversion is not property of the new Chapter 7 estate.  Rather, 
the debtor retains a vested interest in the property, and thereby 
the property reverts to the debtor on conversion, assuming that 
the debtor does not convert in bad faith.
6
  Moreover, absent 
                                                 
5
 Not all property necessarily will meet this requirement.  For 
example, a debtor whose title to particular property is terminated 
by a divorce decree while his Chapter 13 case is pending no 
longer has control of the property when the case is converted to 
Chapter 7, and thus the property is not part of the Chapter 7 
estate after conversion even though it was included initially in 
the Chapter 13 estate.  See, e.g., Yoon v. Krick (In re Krick), 373 
B.R. 593, 608 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2007) (holding that a parcel of 
real estate that was included in a couple‘s Chapter 13 estate at 
the time of the filing of their Chapter 13 petition, and in 
connection with marital dissolution proceedings was determined 
to be the property of the parents of the former wife debtor, was 
not property of that debtor‘s converted Chapter 7 estate because 
she did not have an interest in the real estate and thus it was not 
under her control). 
6 
On the issue of vesting, the Trustee draws our attention to 
§ 349(b)(3), which provides that the dismissal of a case under 
the Bankruptcy Code, including a Chapter 13 case, ―revests the 
property of the estate in the entity in which such property was 
vested immediately before the commencement of the case under 
this title.‖  None of the sub-sections of § 348 contains similar 
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anything to the contrary (and we know of nothing), by providing 
that a debtor who converts in bad faith is not entitled to this 
post-petition property, § 348(f)(2) logically requires that a 
debtor receive the property if he acts in good faith.   
                                                                                                             
―revesting‖ language.  As such, it may be argued that Congress 
intended to distinguish the two methods of terminating an estate 
(conversion and dismissal), and that if it meant for property of 
the estate to ―revest‖ in the debtor on conversion, it would have 
included similar language in § 348.  See In re Plata, 958 F.3d at 
923 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (distinguishing §§ 348 and 349).  
However, in the Chapter 13 context this argument overlooks that 
(i) under § 1326(a)(2) the trustee must return all payments held 
by it to the debtor if a plan is not confirmed, or (ii) under 
§ 1327(b) property of the estate already is vested in the debtor at 
the time of the conversion after confirmation of a plan.  Sections 
348 and 349 are broad provisions applicable to every Chapter of 
the Bankruptcy Code.  The specific provisions of Chapter 13 
supersede any distinction that may be read into these proceeding 
general provisions.  
Moreover, if a Chapter 13 debtor is concerned about obtaining 
funds held by the Chapter 13 trustee, he can dismiss his case 
rather than convert.  As noted by the Ninth Circuit Court, we can 
discern ―no justification for requiring a debtor to dismiss, rather 
than convert . . . [,] in order to preserve his exemption rights.  
Aside from creating a trap for the unwary, such a requirement 
would merely elevate form over substance and inject a needless 
degree of extra work on the part of all concerned.‖  In re Plata, 
958 F.2d at 922; see also In re Boggs, 137 B.R. at 410 
(―Debtors, whose motion was prompted in part by health 
problems, are willing to have their case dismissed if necessary to 
obtain the funds the Trustee holds.‖).     
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We also believe that returning undistributed funds to the 
debtor better aligns with the Chapter 13 trustee‘s limited duties 
post-conversion and the effect of conversion on a confirmed 
Chapter 13 plan.  Though the trustee must account for the funds 
that came into his possession by filing a final report after 
conversion under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
1019(5)(b)(ii), it does not follow that he is permitted to 
distribute funds under a plan that is no longer operative, 
particularly if those funds remain vested in the debtor until 
distribution.  In light of § 348(e)‘s termination of the trustee‘s 
services post-conversion, his duties thereafter should be 
narrowly construed.  If a Chapter 13 case is converted to a 
Chapter 7 case after plan confirmation, the vested funds revert 
to the debtor, and their return should be considered part of the 
Chapter 13 trustee‘s short list of remaining duties.7     
                                                 
7
 In the pre-confirmation context, the trustee is obligated to pay 
allowed administrative expenses from accumulated payments he 
is holding.  Id. § 1326(a)(2).  Though this creates the anomalous 
outcome that if a Chapter 13 proceeding is converted pre-
confirmation administrative expense claims will be paid from 
undistributed plan payments, but if the proceeding is converted 
post-confirmation no administrative expense claims can be paid 
from undistributed plan payments, this inconsistency is 
addressed by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.  Rule 
1019(6) provides for the filing after conversion of pre-
conversion administrative expense claims.  Fed. R. Bank. P. 
1019(6) (―Upon the filing of the schedule of unpaid debts 
incurred after commencement of the case and before conversion, 
the clerk, or some other person as the court may direct, shall 
give notice to those entities listed on the schedule of the time for 
filing a request for payment of an administrative expense . . . .‖). 
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The legislative history of § 348(f) supports that 
Congress‘s intended outcome is that payments held by the 
Chapter 13 trustee revert to the debtor on conversion.  Congress 
stated that it was overruling the holdings of Matter of Lybrook 
and similar cases, and ―adopting the reasoning‖ of our decision 
in Bobroff.  H.R. Rep. No. 835, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1994). 
It included the following illustration of the ―serious disincentive 
to file chapter 13 filings‖ it sought to eliminate with § 348(f).  
Id.  
[A] debtor who had $10,000 equity in a home at 
the beginning of the case, in a State with a 
$10,000 homestead exemption, would have to be 
counseled concerning the risk that after he or she 
paid off a $10,000 second mortgage in the chapter 
13 case, creating $10,000 in equity, there would 
be a risk that the home could be lost if the case 
were converted to chapter 7 (which can occur 
involuntarily).  If all of the debtor‘s property at 
the time of conversion is property of the chapter 7 
estate, the trustee would sell the home . . . to 
realize the $10,000 in equity for the unsecured 
creditors and the debtor would lose the home. 
                                                                                                             
In addition, if a debtor continues a Chapter 13 case until a plan 
is confirmed before converting merely to escape the trustee‘s 
payment of administrative expense claims under § 1326(a)(2), 
the debtor should be found to have converted in bad faith under 
§ 348(f)(2), and all post-petition property should be awarded to 
the Chapter 7 estate to be distributed to creditors, including 
those holding administrative expense claims. 
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Id.  By analogy from this example, a debtor who contributes 
post-petition earnings to the Chapter 13 estate under a confirmed 
plan when the Chapter 13 trustee has not distributed those funds 
to creditors should not lose those earnings on conversion.  
Section 348(f)(1) provides that the earnings are not property of 
the new Chapter 7 estate.  The Chapter 7 trustee thus cannot 
transfer those earnings to unsecured creditors.  Holding that the 
Chapter 13 trustee must disburse the earnings to creditors under 
the Chapter 13 plan after conversion would result in creditors 
receiving a portion of the Chapter 13 estate when the legislative 
history of § 348(f) suggests that this property belongs to the 
debtor.  
Such an outcome also would dissuade debtors from filing 
under Chapter 13.  Encouraging them to attempt to repay their 
debts through a reorganization plan rather than liquidate was the 
reasoning underlying our decision in Bobroff.  We noted that 
[i]f debtors must take the risk that property 
acquired during the course of an attempt at 
repayment will have to be liquidated for the 
benefit of creditors if chapter 13 proves 
unavailing, the incentive to give chapter 13 -- 
which must be voluntary -- a try will be greatly 
diminished.  Conversely, when chapter 13 does 
prove unavailing ―no reason of policy suggests 
itself why the creditors should not be put back in 
precisely the same position as they would have 
been had the debtor never sought to repay his 
debts . . . .‖ 
Bobroff, 766 F.2d at 803 (quoting In re Hannan, 24 B.R. 691, 
692 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)).  In this context, holding that the 
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Chapter 13 trustee must distribute undisbursed plan payments to 
creditors would contravene Congress‘s reasoning in adopting 
§ 348(f).    
   Additionally, in adding § 348(f) Congress rejected the 
analysis of those Courts of Appeals holding that undistributed 
funds after Chapter 13 plan confirmation belong to creditors.  
Those Courts based their decisions on fairness to creditors, 
concluding that ―a rule of once in, always in[,] is necessary to 
discourage strategic, opportunistic behavior that hurts creditors . 
. . .‖  Matter of Lybrook, 951 F.2d at 137.  To account for such 
―game-the-system‖ behavior, Congress included § 348(f)(2), 
which in effect ―gives the court discretion, in a case in which the 
debtor has abused the right to convert and converted in bad 
faith, to order that all property held at the time of conversion 
shall constitute property of the estate in the converted [here, 
Chapter 7] case.‖  H.R. Rep. No. 835, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 57 
(1994).  The punishment for acting in bad faith is that property 
that otherwise would belong to the debtor goes instead to his 
Chapter 7 estate for distribution to creditors.  But, as already 
noted, if a debtor does not act with bad faith in converting, 
logically the property should not go automatically to creditors; 
otherwise the penalty for a bad faith conversion would be 
diminished significantly. 
 Indeed, since the passage of § 348(f), all Courts of 
Appeals that have considered the disposition of a Chapter 13 
estate‘s property on conversion to Chapter 7 have concluded that 
the policy reasoning we expressed in Bobroff now has become 
settled law.
8
  See Stamm v. Morton (In re Stamm), 222 F.3d 216, 
                                                 
8
 The Trustee argues that the reasoning of Bobroff does not 
apply here because it did not involve a confirmed plan.  Though 
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217–18 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that in  Baker v. Rank (In re 
Baker), 154 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 1998), ―[w]e stated that Congress 
added Section 348(f) ‗to resolve the circuit split,‘ quoted the 
relevant statutory language, and noted that Congress ‗took issue 
with In re Lybrook.‘  The clear implication . . . is that Section 
348(f)(1), where applicable, establishes that the post-petition 
income does not remain property of the estate upon conversion.‖ 
(quoting In re Baker, 154 F.3d at 536 n.2)); Young v. Key Bank 
of Maine (In re Young), 66 F.3d 376, 378 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(concluding that post-petition contributions of income by the 
debtor pursuant to a confirmed plan were not property of the 
Chapter 7 estate on conversion and noting that ―[t]he 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 answered the very question that 
confronts us.  It essentially codified the Bobroff rule . . .‖).  See 
also Bell v. Bell (In re Bell), 225 F.3d 203, 217 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(observing that ―[i]n the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 
Congress resolved this circuit split . . . by enacting 11 U.S.C. § 
348(f)‖); 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 348.07[1] (―The addition of 
[§ 348(f)] clarified that Congress had intended the result reached 
by cases that had not included in the postconversion chapter 7 
estate the property acquired by the debtor during the 
preconversion chapter 13 case.‖).       
                                                                                                             
confirmation of a plan is a significant event in a Chapter 13 
case, nothing in Bobroff suggests the pre-confirmation status of 
that bankruptcy case was critical to our reasoning, nor does 
anything in the language of § 348(f) or its legislative history 
indicate Congress‘s intent that bankruptcy courts treat 
undistributed post-petition property differently depending on 
whether the Chapter 13 case was converted before or after 
confirmation of the plan.   
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 Overall, a textual reading of § 348(f), particularly in light 
of its legislative history, leads us to conclude that undistributed 
plan payments held by a Chapter 13 trustee at the time of 
conversion must be returned to the debtor absent bad faith.  This 
result furthers Congress‘s preference that on conversion to 
Chapter 7 a Chapter 13 debtor receive all post-petition property 
that is held by the Chapter 13 trustee, but still is under the 
control of the debtor, so that debtors are encouraged to attempt 
to repay their debts through reorganization rather than 
liquidation.   
We recognize that a practical consequence of this method 
of encouragement is that, when a debtor converts to Chapter 7 
after a Chapter 13 plan has been confirmed, the total amount of 
payments to creditors under the plan will depend on the timing 
of conversion and the practices of the Chapter 13 trustee.  The 
Bankruptcy Code requires the Chapter 13 trustee to make 
disbursements ―as soon as practicable.‖  11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2). 
In practice, the most efficient method of administering payments 
may be for the trustee to accumulate and distribute them to 
creditors at an established time.  See, e.g., In re Hardin, 200 
B.R. 312, 313 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996) (noting that ―often some 
accumulation will occur . . . prior to the making of a distribution 
to creditors‖).  For example, some trustees make plan 
disbursements twice a month, while some only once a month.  
Or a trustee may be holding funds for a reason particular to a 
case, as here.  Section 348(f)(2)‘s bad faith provision may 
correct for a debtor‘s opportunistic behavior, but outside a 
finding of bad faith it will not prevent a converting debtor 
receiving funds intended initially for Chapter 13 creditors.  To 
deal with this potential happenstance, we foresee that creditors 
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will request more frequent distributions from the Chapter 13 
trustee.
9
   
                                                 
9
 Creditors may avail themselves of other options to increase the 
likelihood that they will receive payments made by a debtor 
under a confirmed plan.   
(1)  If a Chapter 13 trustee is accumulating funds because a 
creditor is refusing to receive payments under the plan, as here, 
creditors can move to modify the plan.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1329(a)(1) (―At any time after confirmation of the plan but 
before the completion of payments under such plan, the plan 
may be modified, upon request of the . . . holder of an allowed 
unsecured claim, to . . . increase or reduce the amount of 
payments on claims of a particular class provided for by the 
plan.‖).   
(2)  Creditors can move to compel the trustee to make 
distributions under the plan immediately after the debtor files its 
motion to convert.   
(3)  Section 1327(b) provides that ―[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the 
confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in 
the debtor.‖   
Creditors can object to a proposed plan that does not provide 
that plan payments vest in creditors immediately on receipt by 
the Chapter 13 trustee.  They likewise can request that similar 
language be included in the Bankruptcy Court‘s order 
confirming the plan.  Though we do not rule on the issue, such 
language may be sufficient to remove undistributed plan 
payments held by the trustee from property ―under the control of 
the debtor on the date of conversion.‖  11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1).   
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*    *    *    *    * 
As applied here, when the Plan was no longer feasible, Michael 
exercised the right to convert his case to Chapter 7 and sought 
the return of his post-petition earnings still in the Trustee‘s 
possession.  Because there is no evidence that he converted in 
bad faith, those funds are his property by virtue of § 348(f), and 
should not be distributed to his creditors.  The Bankruptcy and 
District Courts‘ decisions reflect the result that Congress 
contemplated in enacting § 348(f).  We thus affirm.   
 
1 
 
In re:  Barry L. Michael  
No. 11-1992 
          
ROTH, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 Barry Michael converted his bankruptcy from Chapter 
13 to Chapter 7.  The question we must answer is whether 
Michael’s undistributed post-confirmation, but pre-
conversion, wages, which were paid to the Chapter 13 trustee 
pursuant to the confirmed reorganization plan, should be 
distributed to his creditors pursuant to the plan or returned to 
Michael.  The Majority concludes that the addition of 11 
U.S.C. § 348(f) to the Bankruptcy Code mandates that the 
funds revert to Michael.  I respectfully disagree.  The 
language of § 348(f) does not require such a result.  
 
 I turn first to the context in which this situation is most 
likely to occur.  When a Chapter 13 plan of reorganization 
has been confirmed, the debtor will make regular payments to 
the Chapter 13 trustee.  In many cases, the funds come from a 
wage attachment as happened here.  At regular intervals -- 
monthly, bi-monthly -- the trustee, pursuant to § 1326(c), 
shall pay out the funds to the creditors as provided for in the 
confirmed plan.  The trustee is the conduit for the funds to get 
to the creditors.  Thus, the funds held by the trustee prior to 
these pay-outs do not build up significantly.  If, ultimately, 
the debtor cannot keep up with the provisions of the plan and 
decides to convert to Chapter 7, the accumulated funds in the 
hands of the trustee are not of a sizeable amount.  Thus, there 
has been little reason to dispute their disposition. 
2 
 
 The reason for the accumulation of the funds here was 
because GMAC Mortgage refused to accept the payments 
pursuant to the plan after August 15, 2006, and sent the 
checks back to the trustee.  Michael had been unable to keep 
up his own regular payments on the mortgage; as a result, on 
August 15, GMAC Mortgage obtained relief from the 
automatic stay in order to foreclose.  Michael’s wage 
attachment, however, continued on until October 2009 when 
he converted his bankruptcy to a Chapter 7.  Although the 
plan provided for distribution to other secured and unsecured 
creditors, the trustee did not make payments to them.  For that 
reason, more than $9,000 accumulated in the hands of the 
trustee.  During this three year period, either Michael or the 
trustee could have requested an amendment to the plan.  
Neither did so.  Michael continued to make payments for the 
benefit of his creditors.  He also continued to enjoy the 
benefits of a Chapter 13 plan.
1
      
 
 There is little precedent to assist us in resolving this 
situation.  There is evidence, however, that at least within the 
Third Circuit, the custom has been that, when a debtor 
converted a Chapter 13 bankruptcy to a Chapter 7, the 
Chapter 13 trustee paid out the accumulated funds to the 
creditors as provided for in the plan.  In fact, in December 
2011, the Third Circuit Judicial Council approved the 
Western District of Pennsylvania Local Bankruptcy Rule 
                                              
1
Generally, the benefits available to a debtor under a 
Chapter 13 plan of reorganization are the saving of a 
residence from foreclosure, the curing a mortgage 
delinquency over time with more affordable payments, the 
maintaining of possession and use of an automobile or other 
personal property, and the automatic stay. 
3 
 
3021-1(f), which provides that “[i]n the event of conversion 
or dismissal following the confirmation of a chapter 13 plan, 
then the chapter 13 trustee shall distribute all funds received 
prior to the effective date of the conversion or dismissal, in 
accordance with the terms of the confirmed plan.”  The Clerk 
of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania believes that this rule codified a long time 
practice, going back to 2004.  This rule -- or practice -- has 
not been challenged until, in this case, the sum held by the 
trustee became a sizeable one.  The issue then is:  Who gets 
the benefit of this windfall, the debtor or the creditors?   
 
To answer this question, we must determine whether 
these funds -- on conduit through the trustee to the creditors 
in accord with the confirmed plan -- are property of the 
Chapter 13 estate.   
 
As the Majority observes, prior to the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1994 (Act), courts were sharply divided on 
whether post-petition and post-confirmation property, which 
was acquired by the debtor during a Chapter 13 case, 
remained property of the bankruptcy estate or was returned to 
the debtor upon the estate’s conversion to Chapter 7.  
Compare Resendez v. Lindquist, 691 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 
1982) with Bobroff v. Cont’l Bank (In re Bobroff), 766 F.2d 
797, 803 (3d Cir. 1985).  The Act sought to resolve this 
dispute with the amendment to § 348, which provided that 
“when a case under chapter 13 . . . is converted to a case 
under another chapter,” 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1), the “property 
of the estate in the converted case shall consist of property of 
the estate, as of the date of filing of the petition, that remains 
in the possession of or is under the control of the debtor on 
the date of conversion,” id. at § 348(f)(1)(A).   
4 
 
I agree that the amendment described what became of 
property or rights to property acquired by the debtor during 
the pendency of the Chapter 13 proceedings.  I have no 
argument against this interpretation.  Mr. Bobroff
2
 keeps his 
potential tort recovery and Mr. Lybrook
3
 keeps the farm land 
inherited from his father because the tort recovery and the 
farmland inheritance were not property of the estate as of the 
date of the filing of the petition.
4
  To the extent that Michael’s 
wages were not attached, the amendment also covered these 
unattached wages earned during the course of the Chapter 13 
bankruptcy.  On conversion, these wages would not be 
transferred to the Chapter 7 estate.  See Stamm v. Morton (In 
re Stamm), 222 F.3d 216, 217 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Section 
348(f)(1), where applicable, establishes that the [debtors’] 
post-petition income does not remain property of the estate 
upon conversion”).  There is simply no language that suggests 
otherwise.  See e.g., In re Pegues, 266 B.R. 328, 331-32 
(Bankr. D. Md. 2001); In re Bell, 248 B.R. 236, 239 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Hardin, 200 B.R. 312, 313 (Bankr. 
E.D. Ky. 1996).   
 
However, we are not dealing simply with wages here 
but with that portion of the wages that had been attached 
                                              
2
Bobroff, 766 F.2d at 803. 
3
Matter of Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136 (7
th
 Cir. 1991). 
4
I would note, however, that neither the Bobroff  nor 
the Lybrook Chapter 13 plans were confirmed.  A confirmed 
plan would have dealt with these property expectations during 
the period of reorganization.  It would appear that the 
consideration of these additional assets may be a factor in the 
failure of approval of a plan of reorganization. 
5 
 
under the plan and paid to the trustee for distribution to the 
creditors.  I maintain that there is a crucial difference.  It is 
my position that, although the debtor’s unattached wages 
earned during the reorganization period will not be included 
in the Chapter 7 estate, the attached wages that have been 
paid to the trustee pursuant to the plan should be.  Under the 
plan, these wages are under the supervision and control of the 
trustee.
5
  Because these funds are under the supervision and 
control of the trustee, they should be paid out by the trustee in 
accord with the provisions of the plan.  Moreover, the 
attached wages are the quid pro quo that the debtor has given 
up during the pendency of the reorganization in return for 
being permitted to stave off foreclosure and cure the 
mortgage default, retain the use of his automobile, and enjoy 
the automatic stay.   
 
The Majority depends on Bobroff to support its 
decision.  However, a careful analysis of Bobroff reveals that 
the Court’s decision was motivated by its fear of potential 
inequities that might result when the recovery from a debtor’s 
post-petition litigation was included in a converted Chapter 7 
estate.  Central to the Court’s decision was the notion that 
creditors should not receive a windfall from funds that would 
not have been in the bankruptcy estate if the initial filing had 
been for a Chapter 7 proceeding.  According to the Court, 
such a result would be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy 
                                              
5The plan provides in paragraph 1 that “[t]he future 
earnings of the Debtor are submitted to the supervision and 
control of the trustee – Debtor’s employer shall pay to the 
Trustee the sum of $138.62 bi-weekly, beginning in May, 
2006 for a period of 53 months, plus $1,294.67 paid as of 
April 4, 2006.”   
6 
 
Code’s goal of encouraging debt repayment.  See Bobroff, 
766 F.2d at 803.  If a debtor had to risk losing either all or a 
portion of the property he acquired during his repayment 
attempt, the incentive to try voluntary repayment would be 
substantially diminished.  Id.  The Court, therefore, opined 
that post-petition funds should revert to the debtor in order to 
ensure that both the creditors and debtor would be returned to 
“precisely the same position they were in had the debtor 
never sought to repay his debts . . ..”  Id.6    
 
The concerns the Court expressed in In re Bobroff, 
however, are not present in Chapter 13 proceedings where a 
debtor derives a benefit from the confirmed bankruptcy plan.  
Once a reorganization plan is confirmed, the relationship 
between the debtors and creditors change; the provisions of 
the plan bind the parties, generating benefits and 
corresponding responsibilities.  11 U.S.C. § 1327(a); see 
Ledford v. Burns (Matter of Burns), 90 B.R. 301, 304 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1988) (“[A] Chapter 13 Plan represents a 
legislatively sanctioned, and judicially approved new series of 
rights and responsibilities among the debtor and the debtor’s 
creditors”).  In fact, under a confirmed plan, each party 
receives a benefit.  The debtor is entitled to continue 
“receiving whatever benefits []he believed were significant 
enough for [him] to have converted to and proceeded in 
                                              
6
Of course, Bobroff is also distinguishable from this 
case in the fact that the Court in Bobroff  held that because the 
debtor was not eligible for Chapter 13, “the conversion to that 
chapter was void ab initio and the provisions of § 1306 
cannot be invoked to determine which property comprises the 
estate.”  Bobroff, 706 F.3d at 803. 
7 
 
Chapter 13,”7 In re Bell, 248 B.R.at 239, and the creditors 
receive the money paid into the Chapter 13 estate, In re 
Pegues, 266 B.R. at 336.  Thus, the debtor makes payments in 
order to fulfill his obligations under the reorganization plan 
and in exchange for the benefits he derives from the plan.
8
  In 
                                              
7
Although varied, the benefits a debtor receives may 
include: saving a residence from foreclosure, curing a 
mortgage delinquency over time with more affordable 
payments, maintaining possession over an automobile or 
other personal property, or having the benefit of the automatic 
bankruptcy stay remain in place for an extended period of 
time. 
8
Conversion does not retroactively alter this 
arrangement and undo the benefits the debtor received from 
the plan.  See e.g., In re Pegues, 266 B.R. at 336; In re 
Galloway, 134 B.R. 602, 603 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1991); 
Waugh v. Saldamarco, (In re Waugh), 82 B.R. 394, 398-99 
(W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Redick, 81 B.R. 881, 887 (E.D. Mich. 
1987).  The funds the debtor paid were in exchange for the 
benefits of the reorganization plan.  Revocation of the plan 
only alters this dichotomy going forward; it does not 
“retroactively revoke the intent,” In re Bell, 248 B.R. at 239, 
that debtors had when they initially chose to file under 
Chapter 13; nor does it retroactively alter the fact that a 
debtor made payments “to continue to enjoy the ongoing 
benefits of that plan,” id at 240.   
The Bankruptcy Code supports this view.  Sections 
1326(a)(2) & (c) affirmatively set forth the Chapter 13 
trustee’s obligation to distribute a debtor’s payments to 
creditors pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) & (c).  Although § 348(e) terminates the 
8 
 
re Bell, 248 B.R. at 239; see In re Lennon, 65 B.R. 130, 136 
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (“These payments are specifically earmarked 
and set aside for distribution to creditors provided for by the 
confirmed plan”).   
 
Here, unlike in Bobroff, the payments Michael made 
were in exchange for the benefits he derived from the plan.  
Therefore, if the undistributed funds revert to him, instead of 
being distributed to the creditors in accordance with the 
plan’s terms, Michael would receive a windfall.  See O’Quinn 
v. Brewer (In re O’ Quinn), 143 B.R. 408, 413 (Bankr. S.D. 
Miss. 1992) (“It appears to this Court to be patently unfair to 
allow a debtor to drive and depreciate an automobile, occupy 
a home or use household goods based on a promise to his 
creditors in the form of a court approved plan, and then allow 
the debtor to snatch away the monies which the trustee is 
holding to make the payments, but has not yet disbursed, by 
allowing the debtor to pick an opportune time to convert”).  
He would obtain the benefits the confirmed plan offered 
                                                                                                     
services of the trustee when a case is converted to chapter 7, 
the trustee is still required to perform certain tasks.  See Fed. 
R. Bankr. P. 1019.  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
1019 details several of these post-conversion duties.  See e.g., 
id. at 1019(4), 1019(5)(B)(ii).  Thus, the Rule demonstrates 
that Congress did not intend § 348(e) to be interpreted too 
literally.  Since Congress intended for the trustee to perform 
several ancillary duties to clean-up and finalize the 
administration of the estate, In re Parrish, 275 B.R. 424, 430 
and & n.7 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2002), there is no logical reason 
why distribution of funds pursuant to the previously 
confirmed reorganization plan cannot be included as one of 
those administrative duties. 
9 
 
without having to pay his creditors.  Such a result would not 
only be patently unfair, but also contradict the reasoning of 
Bobroff.
9
  Michael would be in a better position (and his 
creditors in a worse position) than he would have been if he 
had initially filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. 
 
Therefore, my interpretation of § 348(f) will not 
discourage voluntary debt repayment under Chapter 13.  It 
merely requires debtors to honor their obligations to creditors 
as was agreed under the confirmed plan.  In re Bell, 248 B.R. 
at 240.  I hope that we will not see the reversal of a Third 
Circuit practice that over the years has balanced the benefits 
to both parties under a plan of reorganization by providing 
that the undistributed funds held by the trustee will be 
distributed to the creditors pursuant to the confirmed plan.  If 
we adopt the Majority’s position, we will be permitting a 
windfall in this unusual case where inaction by the debtor and 
by the trustee has permitted funds to accumulate in a situation 
in which that normally would not occur.   
 
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
                                              
9
Although the Majority does not explicitly state, it 
implies that § 348(f)’s bad faith provision, see 11 U.S.C. § 
348(f)(2), would prevent this type of harm from befalling 
creditors.  This argument is unconvincing.  One can conjure 
many scenarios where a debtor files for Chapter 13 
bankruptcy, with bona fide intentions of repaying his 
financial obligations, only to discover that he miscalculated 
his ability to repay his creditors.  This type of conduct cannot 
be characterized as “game-the-system” behavior.     
